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ABSTRACT 
In order to prevent accidents in radiotherapy, it is important to learn from accidents that have occurred previously. 
Lessons learned from a  number of accidents are summarised and underlying patterns are looked for in this paper. 
Accidents can be prevented by applying several safety layers of preventive actions. Categories of these preventive 
actions are discussed together with specific actions belonging to each category of safety layer. © 2007 Biomedical 
Imaging and Intervention Journal. All rights reserved. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Preparation  and  execution  of  radiotherapeutic 
treatment is a complex task with many inherent hazards. 
When considering the potential risks in radiotherapy, it 
should, however, always be recognised that the treatment 
has a potential substantial benefit to the patient. 
In attempting to avoid accidents in radiotherapy, it is 
very  important  to  remember  the  lessons  that  can  be 
learned  from  previous  radiotherapy  accidents  and  to 
ensure that preventive actions are applied in a clinical 
setting.  A  number  of  accidents  have  been  thoroughly 
investigated  and  the  lessons  learned  have  been 
disseminated [1-4] by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency  (IAEA).  The  International  Commission  on 
Radiological Protection (ICRP) has summarised causes 
and  contributory  factors  for  radiotherapy  accidents  in 
2000 [5]. 
Prevention  of  accidents  in  radiotherapy  involves 
applying several layers of preventive actions, addressing 
this issue at several levels. It is suggested [6] that these 
layers encompass: 
1.  Actions  where  potential  deviations  from 
intended  dose  and  geometry  can  be  found 
before the first irradiation-fraction of the patient; 
2.  Actions where deviations can be found during 
or after the treatment course; 
3.  Application of safety-technology; 
4.  Application of safety procedures; and 
5.  Actions  where  contributing  factors  such  as 
staffing-levels  and  structure,  training  and 
communication are addressed. 
The  first  objective  of  this  review  is  to  assess 
common  aspects  of  lessons  learned  from  major 
radiotherapy accidents in order to highlight patterns seen 
during accidents. This follows a review performed by the 
author  of  the  creation  of  an  IAEA  regional  training 
course  on  prevention  of  accidental  exposure  in 
radiotherapy. The second objective is to identify actions 
within the preventive layers as suggested above. 
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LESSONS LEARNED FROM MAJOR RADIOTHERAPY 
ACCIDENTS 
Specific  lessons  learned  from  some  of  the  major 
radiotherapy  accidents  are  presented  below.  Case 
histories are not presented in detail, as they have been 
described  in  the  literature.  Finally,  the  lessons  learned 
are  grouped  under  four  headings,  highlighting  patterns 
seen in the lessons learned. 
Incorrect decay data (USA) [7] 
During a time period of two years, a physicist failed 
to  perform  regular  measurements  [calibrations  and 
quality assurance (QA)] on a cobalt unit for radiotherapy 
but  instead  relied  on  estimations  of  the  decay  of  the 
source in order to predict the dose rate for calculation of 
the treatment time. The dose rate was plotted on a graph 
paper and the dose rate was extrapolated over time. This 
extrapolation  was  done  incorrectly,  resulting  in  the 
patients receiving overdoses of 10% to 55%. 
Some  of  the  specific  lessons  learned  from  this 
accident were: 
1.  Independent check of a physicist’s work should 
be performed 
2.  Formal procedures for calibrating the treatment 
unit on a regular schedule should exist and be 
followed. 
3.  A department should provide sufficient staff to 
handle the workload. 
4.  Records  must  accurately  document  the 
performance of accepted QA procedures. 
Erroneous use of treatment planning system (UK) [8] 
When  a  computerised  treatment  planning  system 
(TPS)  was  brought  into  clinical  use,  a  hospital  began 
treating  with  isocentric  techniques.  The  TPS  correctly 
applied an inverse-square correction for these treatments. 
Not aware of this, an additional distance correction factor 
was  applied  manually  by  the  persons  calculating 
treatment  time.  A  distance  correction  factor  was  thus 
applied  twice  for  all  patients  treated  isocentrically, 
causing patients to receive doses lower than prescribed. 
The  incorrect  procedures  were  found  to  have  been  in 
place  for  approximately  nine  years  before  they  were 
discovered. 
Specific lessons learned include: 
1.  Staff should be properly trained in the operation 
of the equipment and understand the operating 
procedures. 
2.  Quality  Assurance  Programme  procedures 
should  include  complete  commissioning  of 
treatment planning equipment before first use, 
and  procedures  for  independent  checking  of 
patient treatment time calculations. 
Accelerator software problems (USA and Canada) [9] 
A specific type of accelerator relied on software for 
safety interlocks (and not, as in other models, mechanical 
and  electrical  safety  interlocks).  Several  accidents 
occurred involving unintended carousel positioning prior 
to treatment, resulting in extremely high electron energy 
fluence directed towards the patient. 
Some  of  the  specific  lessons  learned  from  this 
accident are: 
1.  Patient reactions should be observed, reported 
and  followed  up,  and  all  reports  of  abnormal 
machine operation should also be investigated. 
2.  The Quality Assurance Program should include 
a  review  of  procedures  for  reporting  unusual 
events. 
3.  Only the software for safety cannot be relied on. 
Computer file not updated (USA) [10] 
Data for treatment time calculations was updated at 
the exchange of a cobalt source by a medical physicist, 
except data for treatment with cobalt beam trimmer bars. 
It was stated by the oncologist that trimmer bars would 
not  be  used  for  treatment  anymore.  Some  time  later, 
treatment with trimmer bars was initiated again. The old 
computer  file  was  used  for  calculations,  but  this  file 
contained the outdated source activity, leading to patient 
treatment  times  that  were  too  long  and  produced 
corresponding overdoses. 
Some specific lessons learned: 
1.  Develop  procedures  that  clearly  indicate  the 
software  commissioned  for  clinical  use,  and 
software  that  has  been  removed  from  clinical 
service. 
2.  The Quality Assurance Program should include 
procedures for verifying the correct function of 
software for patient calculations. 
3.  Perform  manual  calculations  to  confirm 
computer  calculations  of  treatment  time  (and 
use in vivo dosimetry). 
Incorrect repair of accelerator (Spain) [11] 
At the breakdown of a linear accelerator, a company 
technician  on  another  mission  was  called  to  the 
accelerator.  Repair  work  was  started  and  a  beam  was 
recovered. However, a meter display indicated an energy 
selection problem. Treatments were allowed to resume. 
Due to a transistor having short-circuited, a full current 
was  fed  to  the  magnet  system  all  the  time,  making  it 
possible  to  get  a  beam  only  when  maximum  electron 
energy  was  used.  The  repair  work  had  been  incorrect, 
and the resulting beams led to severe patient overdoses. 
Some specific lessons learned: 
1.  The  Quality  Assurance  Programme  should 
include formal procedures for returning medical 
equipment after maintenance, including making 
it  mandatory  to  report  to  the  Physics  group, 
before resuming treatment with patients. 
2.  There  should  be  consideration  of  the  need  to 
verify the radiation beam by the Physics group 
when  the  repair  might  have  affected  beam 
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3.  There should be a procedure to perform a full 
review or investigation when the radiotherapy 
equipment has unusual displays or behaviour. 
Miscalibration of beam (Costa Rica) [1] 
When a new cobalt source replaced an old one, the 
medical physicist made an incorrect interpretation of 0.3 
minutes as being 30 seconds (as opposed to the correct 
interpretation  of  18  seconds)  during  calibration 
measurements. Consequently, the treatment times to be 
used  were  overestimated  by  66%,  resulting  in  severe 
overdoses. 
Some specific lessons learned: 
1.  Ensure  there  is  a  high  level  of  training  and 
competence  in  a  clinic,  to  ensure  safe  use  of 
potentially hazardous sources. 
2.  Ensure  there  are  provisions  to  stimulate 
working with awareness (e.g., a new source is 
expected to require shorter treatment times). 
3.  Ensure  there  are  written  procedures  for 
calibration  of  beams  and  for  independent 
verification  of  safety  critical  tasks  before 
clinical implementation. 
Error in TPS data entry (Panama) [2] 
The  TPS  used  in  a  clinic  had  limitations  in  the 
calculations  and  presentation  of  results.  To  overcome 
these limitations, a new way of entering data was devised 
locally. The TPS accepted this new data entry, without 
giving  a  warning,  but  calculated  incorrect  treatment 
times. The result was severe overdoses to several patients. 
Some specific lessons learned: 
1.  Manufacturers  should  avoid  ambiguity  in 
instructions  and  perform  thorough  testing  of 
software, also for non-intended use. 
2.  The TPS is a safety critical piece of equipment. 
3.  Quality  control  should  include  TPS  and  a 
change  in  procedures  should  be  validated 
before being put into clinical use. 
4.  Computer  calculation  should  be  verified,  at 
least through manual checks for one point. 
5.  Awareness  of  staff  for  unusual  treatment 
parameters should be stimulated and trained. 
Accelerator interlock failure (Poland) [3] 
After  a  power  failure  involving  a  clinic,  an 
accelerator was automatically shut down. At restoration 
of electrical power, the accelerator was restarted. Some 
tests were completed, indicating a low dose rate, leading 
to  the  filament  current  limitation  being  increased  to  a 
high level by staff so that the remaining treatments could 
be  completed.  Unfortunately,  there  had  been  a  double 
fault: firstly a fault in a fuse of the power supply to the 
beam monitoring system, leading to a high dose rate, and 
secondly a diode was broken in the safety interlock chain. 
The combination of these faults, meant that no problem 
was indicated, while the dose rate was in fact many times 
higher than intended. 
Some specific lessons learned: 
1.  There  should  be  an  immediate  check  upon 
power supply shutdowns or unusual display of 
unit, and a written procedure to ensure that this 
check was done. 
Patterns in the lessons learned 
A  report  on  several  accidents  in  radiotherapy 
published by the IAEA [4], reviewed together with the 
specific lessons learned from the cases above, indicate 
that there are patterns in the lessons learned. It can be 
argued that most of the reported accidents occurred when 
certain conditions have been fulfilled. These conditions 
can be grouped as listed below: 
1.  Working  with  awareness  and  alertness: 
Accidental  exposures  have  occurred  owing  to 
inattention to details, and lack of alertness and 
awareness.  This  could  also  be  made  worse  if 
the personnel have to work in conditions prone 
to distractions. 
2.  Procedures:  Accidental  exposures  have 
occurred when there is a lack of procedures and 
checks,  or  when  they  are  not  comprehensive, 
documented or fully implemented. 
3.  Training  and  understanding:  Accidental 
exposures have occurred when there is a lack of 
qualified and well-trained staff, with necessary 
educational background and specialised training. 
4.  Responsibilities:  Accidental  exposures  have 
occurred when there are gaps and ambiguities 
in the functions of personnel along the lines of 
authority  and  responsibility.  In  these  cases, 
safety  critical  tasks  have  been  insufficiently 
covered. 
PREVENTIVE MEASURES 
Human errors should always be expected, leading to 
the  conclusion  that  there  should  be  defences  in  place. 
When a hazard is realised, it is due to weaknesses in this 
defence. These weaknesses can be seen as a combination 
of two factors, with the first factor being active failures 
(mistakes,  lapses  and  procedural  violations)  and  the 
second  factor  being  latent  conditions  (i.e.,  conditions 
built  into  the  system  such  as  understaffing,  high 
workload,  and  inadequate  procedures  or  equipment). 
This  approach  follows  Reason’s  model  [12].  Several 
layers of preventive actions should be put in place. 
Actions where potential deviations from intended dose 
and geometry can be found before the first irradiation-
fraction of the patient 
Independent  verification  of  calculations  has  been 
seen to be lacking in several of the accidents presented 
above.  There  are  indications  that  a  recently  reported 
accident in Glasgow [13] might have been prevented if a 
truly independent calculation check had been used. The 
independency  of  the  check  is  vital  to  be  able  to  find 
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mistakes in the calculation process are due to mistakes in 
the act of transferring information. Another example of 
action  in  this  safety-layer  is  clinical  peer  review  of 
treatment  preparation  (e.g.,  dose  and  volume  to  be 
irradiated). 
Actions where deviations can be found during or after 
the treatment course 
In  vivo  dose  measurement  is  a  way  of  finding 
deviations after one or a few treatment fractions. This is 
regularly  performed  with  diodes.  Systematic  dose 
deviations  as  low  as  about  1-2%  that  affected  large 
groups of patients, have been found by diode systems. 
Another action belonging to this safety-layer is clinical 
monitoring of adverse effects in patients. 
Application of safety-technology 
An example of safety-technology to serve as a safety 
layer  for  the  prevention  of  radiotherapy  accidents  is 
integrated  radiotherapy  networking.  This  implies  the 
automatic transfer of parameters and images as well as 
the  RV-system  on  linear  accelerators.  The  most 
comprehensive level is the full integration of images and 
parameters  throughout  the  treatment  chain,  without 
breaking  the  chain  for  manual  transfer  of  information. 
However, a department often has a mix of electronic and 
manual parameter transfer. It should also be recognised 
that even if the full integration of equipment decreases 
the likelihood of mistakes in transfer of information, it 
does  not  necessarily  remove  the  mistakes  done  in  the 
creation of information. Video and audio monitoring of 
patients are more examples from this safety-layer. 
Application of safety procedures 
There are many types of safety procedures to be put 
in place in order to increase safety in radiotherapy. One 
example is the utilisation of an incident reporting system. 
This has been successfully employed in a non-medical 
setting  for  many  years,  enhancing  safe  practice.  The 
objective  is  for  the  organisation  to  learn  from  events 
within and outside the organisation. Potential incidents 
(near  misses)  are  important  in  this  context.  Another 
example  here  is  the  use  of  documentation  systems  for 
procedures. 
Actions where contributing factors such as staffing-levels 
and structure, training and communication are 
addressed 
Comprehensive training of all staff is mandatory. It 
is important that staff have a full understanding of the 
equipment  being  used  as  well  as  the  data  used.  The 
department should also make sure that all responsibilities 
are allocated and understood, and that the members of 
staff  they  have  been  allocated  to  are  educated 
accordingly and kept up-to-date in training. 
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